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  Interstate water disputes have long been a mainstay of the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction, the traditional forum for sovereign states 
to resolve their water wars peaceably. For over a century, these 
remained disputes between sovereigns: until 2010, when the Court 
permitted a private power company to intervene in such a dispute. 
The decision was an affront to state sovereign control of water 
resources, but its implications reach beyond dignitary concerns. 
Under the public trust doctrine, states have long held a fiduciary 
responsibility to allocate water resources within their borders in the 
interests of their citizens. As global climate change and the increasing 
demands of energy production continue to stress America’s water 
resources, the Court’s decision will further complicate states’ efforts to 
enact sound water policy for the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the Supreme Court permitted Duke Energy Carolinas, 
LLC, (Duke Energy) to intervene in an interstate water-rights dispute 
between North Carolina and South Carolina over the Catawba 
River.1 It marked the first time in the Court’s history that a private 
party successfully intervened in an action for the equitable 
apportionment of an interstate waterway.2 By allowing Duke 
Energy’s intervention, the Court effectively relaxed its standard for 
citizen intervention in equitable apportionments, giving the power 
company unprecedented direct access to the Supreme Court to 
represent its private water interests against the sovereign interests of 
the party-states. 
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 1. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 859 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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The Catawba River runs from North Carolina’s Blue Ridge 
Mountains into South Carolina, where it becomes the Wateree River 
and then the Santee River, before flowing into the Atlantic Ocean. 
Duke Energy operates eleven hydroelectric dams on the Catawba 
River.3 The company also makes significant water withdrawals to cool 
its coal-fired, natural-gas, and nuclear plants, providing power to its 
2.3 million customers in the Carolinas.4 The rapidly growing 
Charlotte, North Carolina metropolitan area has increasingly relied 
on interbasin transfers from the Catawba River to fuel its growth, 
reducing downstream flows into South Carolina, particularly in times 
of drought.5 Drought in the Catawba-Wateree Basin has occurred 
with increasing frequency. The national conservation group American 
Rivers named the Catawba “America’s Most Endangered River” in 
2008 and listed “outdated water supply management” as the primary 
threat to the Catawba-Wateree Basin’s ecosystems.6 The Energy Law 
Journal named Charlotte as the U.S. metropolitan area most at risk of 
water shortages resulting from withdrawals by thermoelectric power 
plants.7 
In 2007, South Carolina sued North Carolina under the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction for an apportionment of the Catawba 
River, complaining that its upstream neighbor was taking more than 
its equitable share of the waterway.8 In particular, South Carolina 
challenged the validity of North Carolina’s interbasin transfers to 
Charlotte and other municipalities.9 Duke Energy, the City of 
Charlotte, and the Catawba River Water Supply Project (CRWSP)10 
all moved to intervene as defendants.11 Justice Alito wrote for the 
 
 3. Id. at 866 (majority opinion). 
 4. Benjamin K. Sovacool, Running on Empty: The Electricity-Water Nexus and the U.S. 
Electric Utility Sector, 30 ENERGY L.J. 11, 26 (2009). 
 5. See First Interim Report of the Special Master at 3–6, South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 
(Orig. No. 138) (“[South Carolina] alleges that the Catawba River Basin is a densely populated 
area that is expected to experience significant population growth over the next decade. It alleges 
that the Catawba is subject to severe periodic fluctuations in water level, and that its flow 
historically has been affected by prolonged droughts.”). 
 6. AM. RIVERS, AMERICA’S MOST ENDANGERED RIVERS: 2008 EDITION 13 (2008), 
available at http://act.americanrivers.org/MER/PDFs/MER_2008.pdf. 
 7. Sovacool, supra note 4, at 24. Thermoelectric generation includes coal-fired, natural-
gas, and nuclear plants. Id. at 13. 
 8. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 858.  
 9. Id. at 859. 
 10. The CRWSP is a bistate entity that provides water to Lancaster County, South 
Carolina and Union County, North Carolina. Id. at 860. 
 11. Id. 
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majority of a closely divided Court, which granted intervention to 
Duke Energy and the CRWSP but denied Charlotte’s motion.12 Chief 
Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in 
part, expressing that all three parties’ motions should have been 
denied to preserve the sovereign nature of equitable-apportionment 
actions.13 
States have historically played a primary role in the allocation of 
water resources within their borders, based on both the state 
sovereign ownership doctrine and the public trust doctrine.14 Over the 
past hundred years, the Supreme Court has developed the doctrine of 
equitable apportionment to allow for the peaceful resolution of 
interstate water-rights conflicts, which have been some of the most 
divisive squabbles between the states.15 Traditionally, these original 
actions have been exclusively disputes between sovereign entities: the 
states, the federal government, and Native American tribes.16 For 
these reasons, Chief Justice Roberts argued in dissent that state 
sovereignty, a key factor in the Court’s equitable-apportionment 
precedents, barred private-party intervention in equitable-
apportionment actions.17 But the Chief Justice’s opinion tells only part 
of the story. The unique nature of water resources in the United 
States indicates that equitable apportionments are unlike other 
original actions. Beyond the equitable-apportionment precedents on 
which he relied, both traditional water federalism—as expressed 
through state public trust doctrines—and the specter of water scarcity 
build an even stronger argument against Duke Energy’s intervention. 
Because the earth has a finite supply of freshwater, water policy 
is fundamentally about tradeoffs between competing uses. The 
energy-water nexus is a principle recognizing the interdependence of 
energy production and water supply in the face of water scarcity. 
Water is critical to energy-resource extraction and energy generation, 
whether it be oil refining, hydroelectric generation, power-plant 
 
 12. Id. at 858–59. Justice Alito was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part was 
joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Id. at 858. 
 13. Id. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 14. See infra Part I.A. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 5, at 24–25. 
 17. See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
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cooling, or emissions scrubbing.18 Traditional fuel sources of 
thermoelectric generation such as coal, natural gas, and nuclear 
power—which account for 87 percent of electricity production in the 
United States19—require significant quantities of water for the cooling 
process. For instance, a five hundred megawatt coal-fired power plant 
uses more than twelve million gallons in a single hour.20 Water 
purification, distribution, and treatment are similarly reliant on 
energy production.21 Electricity accounts for 75 percent of the cost of 
municipal water treatment and supply, and roughly 4 percent of the 
nation’s electricity goes to processing water.22 End use of water, 
particularly activities such as water heating and laundry, also has 
significant energy costs.23 As a result, the energy-water nexus instructs 
that energy policy and water policy should be developed jointly, in 
recognition of this interrelationship.24 
Smart energy-water policy requires an understanding of how 
much water competing modes of electricity generation use. It is 
necessary to distinguish between consumption, in which water is 
 
 18. Ann E. Drobot, Transitioning to a Sustainable Energy Economy: The Call for National 
Cooperative Watershed Planning, 41 ENVTL. L. 707, 715 (2011). 
 19. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR 
DECEMBER 2012: FEBRUARY 2013, at 23 tbl.1.1 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/ 
electricity/monthly/pdf/epm.pdf. 
 20. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., ESTIMATING FRESHWATER NEEDS TO MEET FUTURE 
THERMOELECTRIC GENERATING REQUIREMENTS 8 (2010), available at http://www.netl.doe
.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/2010_Water_Needs_Analysis.pdf. 
 21. Drobot, supra note 18, at 728; Michael E. Webber, Catch-22: Water vs. Energy, SCI. 
AM., Sept. 2008, at 36–39. 
 22. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY DEMANDS ON WATER RESOURCES: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE INTERDEPENDENCY OF ENERGY AND WATER 25 (2006), available at http://
www.sandia.gov/energy-water/docs/121-RptToCongress-EWwEIAcomments-FINAL.pdf#63. 
 23. See id. at 26 (“Activities such as water heating, clothes washing, and clothes drying 
require 14 percent of California’s electricity consumption and 31 percent of its natural gas 
consumption. Most of that use is in the residential sector.”). 
 24. In a report to Congress, the Department of Energy advised that meeting the nation’s 
“energy and water needs [will require] properly valuing each resource, rather than following the 
current U.S. path of largely managing water and energy separately while making small 
improvements in freshwater supply and small changes in energy and water-use efficiency.” U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 22, at 11; see also Hydropower: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Energy & Natural Res., 112th Cong. 4–5 (2011) (statement of Steven G. Chalk, Chief Operating 
Officer and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Renewable Energy, Department of Energy) 
(“We recommend that any studies on [energy] consider potential increases in water demand 
that will result from projected growth of energy production, and that interagency collaboration 
and consultation be part of these studies, as adequate water availability is an issue for every 
sector of the economy.”); Webber, supra note 21, at 36 (“We cannot build more power plants 
without realizing that they impinge on our freshwater supplies. And we cannot build more water 
delivery and cleaning facilities without driving up energy demand.”). 
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removed from the source, and withdrawal, in which water is used and 
returned to its source. The U.S. Geological Survey does not consider 
the 3,160 billion gallons of water that flow daily through hydroelectric 
turbines to be withdrawn—or consumed—because the water remains 
in the river and may even be used by successive dams.25 But 
hydropower also involves significant water consumption via 
evaporation from large storage reservoirs.26 It additionally creates 
significant water-quality impacts on aquatic ecology, such as changes 
in temperature, dissolved-nitrogen and dissolved-oxygen levels, and 
natural flow characteristics.27 Further, hydroelectric generation 
“varies greatly with the amount of water available, depending upon 
weather patterns and local hydrology, as well as on competing water 
uses, such as flood control, water supply, recreation, and in-stream 
flow needs (for example, navigation and the aquatic environment).”28 
Therefore, although most water used for hydropower may technically 
remain in-stream, allocating water to hydropower involves tradeoffs 
with other uses and substantial impacts on riparian ecosystems.29 As 
Part IV discusses, courts are poorly equipped to value natural 
resources and make these tradeoffs between competing uses. 
The effects of global climate change will continue to aggravate 
water-supply problems30 and demand that water and energy policy 
incorporate an understanding of the energy-water nexus. The 
Department of Energy reports that “[l]ong-term cyclical changes in 
precipitation patterns and the effect on flows in rivers and the 
operation of reservoirs and hydroelectric plants are a major concern 
 
 25. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 22, at 20. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 23. 
 28. Id. at 19. 
 29. Cf. Katherine A. Abend, Avoiding Water-Intensive Energy Production: How To Keep 
the Water Running and the Lights On, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,020, 11,024 (2011) (“There are 
always opportunity costs when a community allocates water to support a power plant, instead of 
assigning it to public supply, agricultural, recreational, or environmental uses. The economic 
losses that droughts impose on various economic sectors and the environment demonstrate that 
those sectors would benefit greatly if less water were needed for thermoelectric facilities, 
especially in times of water scarcity.”). 
 30. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1, 7 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf (“[N]umerous 
long-term changes in climate have been observed. These include changes in arctic temperatures 
and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects 
of extreme weather including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity of 
tropical cyclones.”). 
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to the energy industry.”31 The problem is worsened by the fact that in 
the United States, the population is growing most rapidly in areas that 
are already water stressed, such as the Las Vegas, Phoenix, Atlanta, 
and Charlotte metropolitan areas.32 Professor Ann Drobot warns that 
“[p]redicted impacts from climate change along with increased 
demands on both the energy and the water sectors fueled by 
projected population growth threaten to exacerbate already stressed 
water resources, raising the specter of resource supply disruptions in 
both sectors and escalating concerns over national security.”33 As a 
result, now more than ever, good water policy will need to 
incorporate good energy policy, and good energy policy will need to 
incorporate good water policy. 
This Note expands and reframes Chief Justice Roberts’s 
reasoning in South Carolina. It argues that, in addition to the 
Supreme Court’s equitable-apportionment precedents, state-law 
public trust doctrines should have persuaded the Court to deny 
citizen intervention in South Carolina. This Note also considers the 
policy implications of the Court’s challenge to state sovereignty over 
water resources, in light of the energy-water nexus and global climate 
change. Except in extreme circumstances, denying citizen 
intervention is normatively a better result given water scarcity and the 
communal nature of water resources across the United States, as 
reflected in state public trust doctrines. As equitable-apportionment 
actions—and interstate water disputes generally—occur with 
increasing frequency, the Court’s disruption of the balance between 
public and private water interests may significantly undermine both 
state and federal efforts toward more effective water-resource 
management. The Supreme Court has an important role to play as a 
forum of last resort for interstate water-rights disputes between 
sovereign states, but the intrastate allocation of water between 
 
 31. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 22, at 32. Other parts of the country may also face 
the cumulative effects of water shortages and increased demand for water. The U.S. Geological 
Survey predicts that in areas where reservoirs depend on snowmelt, climate change will lead to 
“reduced water availability during the season of peak water demand. This reduction in 
availability would result from a combination of increased evaporation and transpiration from 
warmer temperatures and a lengthening of the warm season, as well as increased irrigation 
demand.” HARRY F. LINS, ROBERT M. HIRSCH & JULIE KIANG, WATER—THE NATION’S 
FUNDAMENTAL CLIMATE ISSUE: A WHITE PAPER ON THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY ROLE 
AND CAPABILITIES 4 (2010), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1347/pdf/circ-1347.pdf.  
 32. ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 8–9, 23–26, 38–40, 83–84 (2009); NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., supra note 20, at 9–10. 
 33. Drobot, supra note 18, at 731. 
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competing uses and users should be determined by elected 
legislatures and expert agencies, not the nation’s high court. 
This analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the legal 
bases for state sovereign ownership of water resources and the 
common-law development of state public trust doctrines. Part II 
examines the Supreme Court’s equitable-apportionment 
jurisprudence, particularly the factors the Court considers when 
evaluating competing claims and the high standards the Court has 
imposed on citizen intervenors. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
decision to permit citizen intervention in South Carolina and argues 
that the public trust doctrine and the Court’s own equitable-
apportionment precedents should have prevented that outcome. 
Finally, Part IV evaluates the Supreme Court’s role in adjudicating 
water rights in light of the energy-water nexus and global climate 
change. 
I.  STATE SOVEREIGN OWNERSHIP OF WATER RESOURCES 
A. Traditional Water Federalism 
Generally speaking, the law of water allocation in the United 
States is state law, based on both the state sovereign ownership 
doctrine and the public trust doctrine. These doctrines are closely 
associated,34 and both were inherited from the English common law, 
in which the monarch held title to certain natural resources for the 
common benefit.35 Under the state sovereign ownership doctrine, the 
state governments assumed the role of the sovereign when they 
declared independence from the crown,36 giving them title to 
 
 34. The state sovereign ownership doctrine recognizes that upon achieving statehood, “one 
consequence is immediate state ownership of certain lands and waters previously owned by the 
British Crown or the federal government.” 2 ROBERT E. BECK, WATERS & WATER 
RIGHTS § 30.02(a) (Amy L. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2011). The state holds these lands and waters “in 
a fiduciary capacity, for the benefit of members of the general public, and indeed, the ‘public 
trust doctrine’ could be regarded as simply the law on the fiduciary aspect of state sovereign 
ownership.” Id. This Note uses the term “sovereign ownership doctrine” to refer to the principle 
of state control of water resources and “public trust doctrine” to refer to a state’s 
responsibilities to its people as a result of sovereign ownership.  
 35. See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842) (“The dominion and 
property in navigable waters, and in the lands under them, [are] held by the king as a public 
trust . . . for the common benefit. In such cases, whatever does not pass by the grant, still 
remains in the crown for the benefit and advantage of the whole community.”). 
 36. See id. at 410 (“[W]hen the Revolution took place, the people of each state became 
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters 
and the soils under them for their own common use . . . .”). New states inherited the same 
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sovereign lands and waters.37 The public trust doctrine is best 
understood as “the fiduciary obligation of the state to hold state 
sovereign resources for the benefit of the general public.”38 Under the 
state sovereign ownership and public trust doctrines, control of water 
resources creates horizontal federalism in water rights.39 Thus, states 
have adopted various schemes for water-rights management and have 
adapted these schemes to changing water needs.40 
Water rights across the United States are usufructuary: a private 
party may have an entitlement to use water but not to own it. 
Contemporary water law reflects a longstanding tradition of 
communal rights in water inherited from the English common law. 
Blackstone wrote that water was incapable of purely private 
ownership, “[f]or water is a movable, wandering thing, and must of 
necessity continue common by the law of nature; so that I can only 
have a temporary, transient, usufructuary property therein.”41 Justice 
Holmes similarly noted, “[F]ew public interests are more obvious, 
indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of 
the public of a State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it 
substantially undiminished.”42 Holmes further emphasized, “This 
public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows 
more pressing as population grows.”43 The essentially public nature of 
water resources has been more aggressively asserted in the western 
United States, where numerous state constitutions and codes 
pronounce that water is public property.44 But eastern states have also 
 
sovereign rights over water as the original states through the equal-footing doctrine. Pollard’s 
Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 216 (1845). 
 37. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40 (1894) (“[T]he title and rights of riparian or 
littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark of navigable waters are governed by the 
local laws of the several States, subject, of course, to the rights granted to the United States by 
the Constitution.”). 
 38. 2 BECK, supra note 34, § 30.02(c); see also Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 77 (1821) 
(describing navigable waters under the public trust as “common to all the citizens . . . subject 
only to the laws which regulate that use; that the property, indeed, strictly speaking, is vested in 
the sovereign, but it is vested in him not for his own use, but for the use of the citizen”). 
 39. Cf. 2 BECK, supra note 34, § 30.02(b) (discussing the public trust doctrine’s 
development as a matter of state law). 
 40. JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, 
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 12–14 (4th ed. 2006). 
 41. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18. 
 42. Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908). 
 43. Id. 
 44. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; TEX. WATER CODE 
ANN. § 11.021(a) (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.010 (West 2004). 
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understood water rights to be usufructuary.45 Thus, the inherently 
communal nature of water rights in the United States complements 
the public trust doctrine in establishing the public values implicated 
by water-resource management. 
Although states continue to play the primary role in allocating 
consumptive water rights, many water resources are under complete 
or partial federal control, creating vertical federalism that coexists 
with horizontal federalism in water rights. For example, the federal 
government’s broad authority over navigable waters is well 
established under the Commerce Clause.46 Under the navigation 
power,47 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
regulates all hydropower projects, and the federal government itself 
owns and operates many hydropower facilities.48 Since the 1970s, the 
federal government has assumed new water-management roles under 
the Clean Water Act49 and the Endangered Species Act.50 
The public values implicated by water are well established in the 
United States based on the state sovereign ownership doctrine, the 
public trust doctrine, and the usufructuary nature of water rights. 
Though federal involvement in water rights has increased in the 
twentieth century, the states continue to bear the responsibility of 
managing water resources on behalf of the public interest when 
Congress has not acted to assert a federal interest. 
 
 45. See 1 BECK, supra note 34, § 6.02(f) (discussing how eastern states, over time, have 
broadened the definition of what constitutes public water); see also United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913) (“[T]hat the running water in a great navigable 
stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.”). 
 46. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940) (“In truth 
the authority of the United States is the regulation of commerce on its waters. Navigability, in 
the sense just stated, is but a part of this whole. Flood protection, watershed development, 
recovery of the cost of improvements through utilization of power are likewise parts of 
commerce control.”). 
 47. See id. at 404 (“[T]he power to regulate commerce necessarily include[s] power over 
navigation.”). 
 48. 2 BECK, supra note 34, § 40.01. 
 49. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 50. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended 
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 40, at 
639–73. 
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B. The Evolving Public Trust and Its Application to Consumptive 
Water Rights 
Although public trust protections were initially applied only to 
navigable waters and fisheries, the doctrine evolved and expanded in 
the United States through federal and state common law. 
1. Illinois Central Introduces Affirmative Public Trust Duties.  In 
the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
public trust doctrine imposed affirmative duties on states to protect 
trust resources in the landmark case Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. 
Illinois.51 This case held that land submerged under navigable waters 
was inalienable and the public trust “require[d] the government of the 
State to preserve such waters for the use of the public.”52 The Court 
characterized the doctrine as “founded upon the necessity of 
preserving to the public the use of navigable waters from private 
interruption and encroachment.”53 Illinois Central departed from the 
dominant understanding of the doctrine in the nineteenth century as 
involving “negative rights, preventing harm but imposing no 
affirmative duties on the landowner or state.”54 Although some 
scholars have questioned both the facts and legal foundation of 
Illinois Central,55 it has enjoyed remarkable influence over natural-
resource policy. 
2. The Ecological Public Trust Doctrine.  In 1970, Professor 
Joseph Sax characterized the public trust as an adaptable judicial 
doctrine that states could employ to protect a wide range of natural 
resources beyond navigable waters and tidal lands.56 According to 
 
 51. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 52. Id. at 452–53. 
 53. Id. at 436. 
 54. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as 
the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57, 70 (2005). 
 55. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust 
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 924 (2004) (noting 
that Justice Field’s opinion was concerned with the anticompetitive practices of a corrupt 
railroad, not environmental preservation). 
 56. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Professor Sax, one of the most prominent voices in 
water law, is widely credited with reviving and reinventing the public trust doctrine. E.g., Carol 
M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 351–52 (1998). His 
seminal 1970 article is amongst the fifty all-time-most-cited law-review articles. Fred R. Shapiro 
& Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 
1490 (2012). 
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Professor Sax, “[p]ublic trust problems . . . occur in a wide range of 
situations in which diffuse public interests need protection against 
tightly organized groups with clear and immediate goals.”57 Professor 
Sax proposes that the “mixture of procedural and substantive 
protections which the courts have applied in conventional public trust 
cases” could be applied to “controversies involving air pollution, the 
dissemination of pesticides, the location of rights of way for utilities, 
and strip mining or wetland filling on private lands in a state where 
governmental permits are required.”58 Under Professor Sax’s account, 
the public trust doctrine is simultaneously a flexible common law 
approach to natural-resource management and a sort of “people’s 
environmental right.”59 In particular, Professor Sax advocates that the 
public trust doctrine should play a major role in the future of water 
allocation and conservation.60 Professor Sax’s public trust doctrine 
assumes that state legislatures and agencies will invariably overstep 
their authority with respect to trust resources—perhaps, as a result of 
legislative or agency capture—and that courts must be given the tools 
to ensure good management practices. Professor Sax’s articulation of 
the public trust is as much a judicial doctrine as it is another argument 
in the environmental advocate’s toolkit, geared toward persuading 
judges that they have the authority to rein in careless legislatures. But 
Professor Sax’s public trust doctrine also raises legitimate concerns 
about judges overruling elected legislatures. 
Some scholars have criticized Professor Sax’s expanded public 
trust doctrine because they see it as a threat to private property 
rights. For instance, Professor Richard Lazarus criticizes the 
expanded public trust doctrine as both ineffective and superfluous in 
the modern regulatory state, noting that “substantive embrace of 
legitimate governmental police power goals is no longer narrow; 
indeed, it is broader and more flexible than the embrace of the trust 
doctrine both in terms of permissible ends and the natural resources 
 
 57. Sax, supra note 56, at 556–57. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the 
People’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195 (1980). 
 60. See Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 474 
(1989) (“[P]ublic values have changed, and the use of water has reached some critical limits. 
One result is that we need to retrieve some water from traditional water users to sustain streams 
and lakes as natural systems and to protect water quality.”). 
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to which it applies.”61 In contrast, Professor Barton Thompson 
articulates a conservative defense of the public trust, suggesting that 
“[t]he public trust doctrine, in summary, does not challenge the value 
and importance of development or private ownership of trust 
resources, nor does it bar development or privatization. Instead, the 
public trust doctrine speaks only against taking development or 
privatization to an excess.”62 Under Professor Thompson’s 
articulation, the public trust doctrine is not a judicial hammer that 
guides policy or overrules legislatures but is rather a means of 
recognizing and articulating “the value of common ownership and 
common management of trust assets” within a private-property 
system, at the state-government level.63 Professor Thompson’s 
narrower view of the public trust better reflects the doctrine’s role in 
most states in which the state government is the people’s trustee of 
water resources. 
3. State Formulations of the Public Trust Doctrine.  Professor 
Robin Kundis Craig suggests “that focusing too intently on the classic 
public trust doctrine and its origins vitiates the real import . . . [which 
is] the individualized state expansions of the classic public trust 
doctrine.”64 All fifty states have adopted some form of the public trust 
doctrine through common law, state constitutions, or statutes.65 
Although in most states the public trust doctrine did not become the 
all-purpose judicial tool Professor Sax envisioned,66 it retains 
 
 61. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 674 (1986). 
 62. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction & 
Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 61 (2006). 
 63. Id. at 68. 
 64. Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State 
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 784 (2010). Professor Craig further 
argues that as climate change redistributes water resources, making wet states drier and dry 
states wetter, “within water law, state public trust doctrines can be particularly well-suited to 
providing legal support for adaptive management-based climate change adaptation regimes,” id. 
at 781, a view that more closely follows Sax. 
 65. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust 
Doctrines: Classification of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust 
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 
37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010). 
 66. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: 
Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223, 228 (2006) (“With some 
notable exceptions, state courts appear to have acted as Lazarus predicted, not as Sax hoped. 
Few cases have actually forced states to alter their resource management plans.”). 
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importance as a comprehensive basis for articulating a state’s right to 
protect and manage the public’s interest in scarce natural resources 
like freshwater, however the state chooses to define the scope of such 
protections. 
Several states have explicitly expanded the public trust doctrine 
to implicate consumptive water rights. For example, California 
extended public trust protections to tributaries as well as navigable 
waters.67 Its Supreme Court required Los Angeles County to reduce 
its water intake from Mono Lake to protect wildlife, holding that 
“[t]he state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into 
account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to 
protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”68 Hawaii extended the 
scope of its public trust doctrine to protect groundwater and created a 
presumption in favor of protecting all natural resources for the public 
benefit.69 Several other states have since designated drinking water as 
a public trust resource or have articulated a right to clean water.70 But 
not every state has followed California’s example. Maine, for 
instance, has limited its public trust doctrine to the traditional 
concerns of navigation, fishing, and fowling.71 Similarly, Arizona 
elected not to apply the public trust to groundwater.72 
These variations in the fifty state public trust doctrines create 
some concern for the incorporation of the public trust doctrine into 
 
 67. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 
1983) (“[T]he public trust doctrine . . . protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion 
of nonnavigable tributaries.”). 
 68. Id. at 728. 
 69. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447–54 (Haw. 2000). 
 70. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-221-702 (2011) (“Recognizing that the waters of the 
state are the property of the state and are held in public trust for the benefit of its citizens, it is 
declared that the people of the state are beneficiaries of this trust and have a right to both an 
adequate quantity and quality of drinking water.”); Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 
1998) (“The public trust doctrine provides that the State holds certain resources (such as 
wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in trust for public use . . . .”); Mayor of Clifton v. Passaic 
Valley Water Comm’n, 539 A.2d 760, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (“[I]t is clear that 
since water is essential for human life, the public trust doctrine applies with equal impact upon 
the control of our drinking water reserves.”); Goldsmith & Powell v. State, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942) (“The Constitution of Texas designates rivers and streams as natural 
resources, declares that such belong to the State, and expressly invests the Legislature with the 
preservation and conservation of such resources.” (citation omitted)). At least eighteen states 
have developed what Professor Craig describes as “ecological public trust doctrines.” Craig, 
supra note 64, at 829–46. 
 71. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me. 1989). 
 72. Seven Springs Ranch, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Water Res., 753 P.2d 161, 165–66 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 
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the Supreme Court’s equitable-apportionment jurisprudence. For 
example, South Carolina boasts relatively strong public trust 
protections for natural resources broadly, including drinking water 
and nonsubmerged lands.73 In contrast, North Carolina’s public trust 
protections are defined more narrowly, “includ[ing], but . . . not 
limited to, the right to navigate, swim, hunt, fish, and enjoy all 
recreational activities in the watercourses of the State.”74 Such 
variations suggest concerns that any federal application of the public 
trust doctrine would necessarily be over- or underinclusive with 
respect to the party-states involved. But based on Illinois Central and 
subsequent cases, federal law recognizes a baseline level of state 
public trust protection for navigable waters.75 The Court has further 
recognized that “it has been long established that the individual 
States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in 
public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see 
fit.”76 Ultimately, the modern public trust doctrine serves to 
supplement the state sovereign ownership doctrine in asserting that 
states retain the primary role in water-resource management, 
representing the interests of their citizens, when Congress has not 
acted to assert a federal interest. Despite the variations between 
states, the public trust doctrine plays a vital role in equitable-
apportionment actions, especially when private interests threaten a 
state’s sovereign responsibility to manage water resources in the 
public interest. 
II.  EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT OF INTERSTATE WATERS 
A. The Court’s Original Jurisdiction as a Forum of Last Resort for 
Sovereign Disputes 
States have historically had three avenues to resolve water 
disputes with other states: (1) interstate compacts subject to 
congressional approval, (2) congressional intervention, and (3) an 
 
 73. Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., 456 S.E.2d 397, 402 (S.C. 1995).  
 74. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-45.1 (West 2000). 
 75. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988) (“[I]t came to be 
recognized as the ‘settled law of this country’ that the lands under navigable freshwater lakes 
and rivers were within the public trust given the new States upon their entry into the Union, 
subject to the federal navigation easement and the power of Congress to control navigation on 
those streams under the Commerce Clause.” (quoting Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 
(1877))). 
 76. Id. at 475. 
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original action before the Supreme Court.77 An interstate compact, 
achieved through negotiations between the party-states, is most 
desirable because it is the approach most likely to achieve a result 
that all parties perceive as fair.78 Congressional apportionment has 
been used less than its alternatives, despite calls for greater federal 
intervention by some commentators.79 That leaves the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction, which has been the forum of last resort 
for states when a mutual agreement could not be reached,80 or when 
one state alleges that another has violated a preexisting agreement.81 
Equitable apportionment developed as a federal common-law 
doctrine to address the interstate water disputes that began to come 
before the Court’s original jurisdiction in the early twentieth century. 
Before 1900, the Court’s original jurisdiction was reserved for 
interstate boundary disputes.82 In Kansas v. Colorado,83 the Supreme 
Court held that a water-rights dispute fell within its original 
jurisdiction over actions between two or more states.84 The Court 
stressed the sovereign nature of the states’ interest in water,85 noting 
that no other appropriate forum existed for the states to resolve such 
 
 77. GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF 
INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2000). 
 78. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and 
Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 410 (1985) (“Negotiation compromise among states is still 
the best apportionment vehicle, but in many cases the product of negotiation—interstate 
compacts—merely postpones the exercise of original jurisdiction.”); cf. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 
U.S. 383, 392 (1943) (suggesting that interstate water disputes “should, if possible, be the 
medium of settlement, instead of invocation of our adjudicatory power”).  
 79. See George William Sherk, The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the 
Twenty-First Century: Is It Time To Call Uncle?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 813–14 (2005) 
(“Congress has acted only twice to apportion interstate water resources.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Caitlin S. Dyckman, Another Case of the Century? Comparing the Legacy and 
Potential Implications of Arizona v. California and the South Carolina v. North Carolina 
Proceedings, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 189, 226 (2011) (“[Equitable apportionment] is generally 
considered a last resort given the associated cost, antagonism, and uncertainty in the resulting 
resource allocation, not to mention the Court’s reluctance to take these cases and act as a trial 
court.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1769 (2011) (resolving a dispute 
between three states over the interpretation of terms in the Yellowstone River Compact). 
 82. Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court’s Management of 
Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185, 198 (1993); Tarlock, supra note 
78, at 384. 
 83. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). 
 84. Id. at 141–43. 
 85. See id. at 146–47 (“Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal, 
we apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case 
may demand . . . .”). 
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a dispute.86 Equitable apportionment was developed for sovereign 
disputes in which “[i]f the two States were absolutely independent 
nations it would be settled by treaty or by force.”87 Thus, from the 
early twentieth century, the Court handled interstate water disputes 
out of necessity rather than a perceived need to guide state water 
policy. 
Procedurally, given that original actions “tax the limited 
resources of [the] Court by requiring [it] ‘awkwardly to play the role 
of factfinder,’”88 the Court relies on an appointed special master.89 The 
master is responsible for taking evidence and preparing a report for 
the Court, but the parties may also gather their own evidence and file 
exceptions to any findings of the special master.90 Although a special 
master is not given the deference typical of appellate review, original 
jurisdiction may have “the practical disadvantage of short-circuiting 
the judicial process to which the Court is accustomed in its appellate 
work.”91 Then-Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court for too often 
deferring to the special master’s findings, making the Court’s original 
jurisdiction more attractive to private litigants.92 In the case of 
sovereign disputes between states, in which the Court’s original 
jurisdiction is exclusive, forum shopping is not a concern. But for 
private litigants, a truncated trial process and direct access to the 
Supreme Court may be quite attractive, if the Court permits their 
intervention. 
 
 86. See id. at 143 (“The States of this Union cannot make war upon each other. They 
cannot ‘grant letters of marque and reprisal.’ They cannot make reprisal on each other by 
embargo. They cannot enter upon diplomatic relations, and make treaties.”). 
 87. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). 
 88. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 863 (2010) (quoting Ohio v. 
Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971)). 
 89. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE DISPUTES: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 43 (2006) (“The special master, appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court 
upon the invocation of its original jurisdiction, in recent decades has played important 
investigatory and recommendatory roles in assisting the court to settle interstate disputes.”). 
 90. Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 
665, 688 (1959). 
 91. McKusick, supra note 82, at 193. 
 92. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 765 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It will 
obviously be tempting to many interests of a variety of persuasions on the merits of a particular 
issue to ‘start at the top,’ so to speak, and have the luxury of litigating only before a Special 
Master followed by the appellate-type review which this Court necessarily gives to his findings 
and recommendations.”). 
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B. The Substantive Law of Equitable Apportionment 
The Court has entered an equitable-apportionment decree—
requiring the upstream user to maintain a specified minimum flow so 
as not to injure the downstream user—only three times.93 Thus, 
although many interstate water-rights disputes have reached the 
Supreme Court, they have usually been resolved outside the Court, in 
the shadow of its equitable-apportionment jurisprudence. 
1. All Relevant Factors.  The Court’s equitable-apportionment 
doctrine allows for a flexible, fact-specific balancing of “all relevant 
factors.”94 The doctrine requires the court “to weigh the harms and 
benefits to competing States,”95 through consideration of 
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the 
several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, 
the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the 
practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, [and] the 
damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to 
downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former.96 
None of the factors are decisive, and in practice they give way to 
more generalized notions of equity and fairness.97 These factors take 
precedence over the water-rights regime of a particular state.98 State 
law will be considered if both states have similar substantive water 
law, but it will not control the analysis.99 The Court has likely 
deemphasized individual state regimes because an equitable-
apportionment decree binds the party-states but not the individual 
water rights of their citizens. A decree may have a significant impact 
on an individual water user. However, because a decree controls the 
rights of state citizens in the aggregate, the allocation of water to 
individual citizens is left to the states themselves.100 
 
 93. 3 BECK, supra note 34, § 45.07(a); see also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) 
(apportioning the North Platte River); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931) 
(apportioning the Delaware River); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (apportioning 
the Laramie River). 
 94. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982). 
 95. Id. at 186. 
 96. Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 618. 
 97. E.g., Tarlock, supra note 78, at 382. 
 98. 3 BECK, supra note 34, § 45.06(b). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 623 (“Nor will the [equitable-apportionment] decree 
interfere with relationships among Colorado’s water users. The relative rights of the 
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2. Efficiency and Conservation Duties.  The Court has recognized 
that states have an affirmative duty to use water efficiently and to 
conserve water resources. In 1982, it reaffirmed, “[C]onservation 
within practicable limits is essential in order that needless waste may 
be prevented and the largest feasible use may be secured . . . . [The] 
doctrine lays on each of these States a duty to exercise her right 
reasonably and in a manner calculated to conserve the common 
supply.”101 But this duty is limited to measures that are “financially 
and physically feasible.”102 In practice, the Court has not always given 
this duty much weight. For example, in Montana v. Wyoming,103 the 
Court explicitly affirmed Wyoming’s right to reduce its downstream 
flows to Montana that resulted from Wyoming’s adoption of new 
“efficient” irrigation technology that, in fact, returned less water to 
the river.104 
States’ affirmative duty to conserve water would seem to arise, at 
least in part, from the public trust doctrine, although the Court has 
never drawn such a connection between Illinois Central and its 
equitable-apportionment jurisprudence. Both the public trust 
doctrine and equitable apportionment are largely products of federal 
common law, and although unnamed, public trust principles are 
implicated in the language of the equitable-apportionment 
conservation duty.105 In particular, a state’s duty to exercise water 
rights “reasonably and in a manner calculated to conserve the 
common supply”106 evokes the fiduciary responsibilities inherent in 
public trust principles. But equitable-apportionment actions implicate 
the duty to conserve more broadly, beyond the public trust doctrine. 
States must pursue efficient use not only for the benefit of their own 
 
appropriators are subject to Colorado’s control.”); Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572, 579 
(1940) (describing that an equitable-apportionment decree “was not intended to restrict 
Colorado in determining the use of the water of the river, according to Colorado laws and 
adjudications, provided the diversions do not exceed the aggregate amount of 39,750 acre feet”). 
 101. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185–86 (1982) (quoting Wyoming v. Colorado, 
259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922)). 
 102. Id. at 185 (quoting Wyoming, 259 U.S. at 486). 
 103. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011). 
 104. See id. at 1779 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Thanks to improved irrigation techniques, 
Wyoming’s farmers and cattlemen appear to consume more of the water they divert from the 
Yellowstone River and its tributaries today than they did 60 years ago—that is to say, less of the 
diverted water ultimately finds its way back into the Yellowstone.”). 
 105. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 106. Colorado, 459 U.S. at 186 (quoting Wyoming, 259 U.S. at 484). 
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citizens but also for the benefit of water users in both upstream and 
downstream states.107 
3. A High Burden for Private-Party Intervention.  In part because 
equitable-apportionment actions do not directly control the water 
rights of individual citizens, the Court has historically imposed a high 
burden for citizen intervention. The Court articulated the standard 
for intervention by private citizens in New Jersey v. New York,108 in 
which it considered Philadelphia’s motion to intervene when 
Pennsylvania had already done so successfully.109 The Court clarified 
the test for intervention, finding that “[a]n intervenor whose state is 
already a party should have the burden of showing some compelling 
interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all 
other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not properly 
represented by the state.”110 In determining that Philadelphia had not 
met its burden, the Court stressed concerns about opening its original 
jurisdiction to an unlimited number of political subdivisions, 
corporations, or persons within a state, such that the Court would be 
effectively arrogating the state’s power to allocate water resources 
amongst its citizens.111 
The Court’s result in New Jersey was dictated by the parens 
patriae doctrine, under which a state is presumed to represent the 
interests of all its citizens with respect to matters implicating state 
sovereignty.112 The Court noted that the high burden for intervention 
was required out of a “necessary recognition of sovereign dignity,” as 
“[o]therwise, a state might be judicially impeached on matters of 
 
 107. See, e.g., id. (“We conclude that it is entirely appropriate to consider the extent to 
which reasonable conservation measures by New Mexico might offset the proposed Colorado 
diversion and thereby minimize any injury to New Mexico users. Similarly, it is appropriate to 
consider whether Colorado has undertaken reasonable steps to minimize the amount of 
diversion that will be required.”). 
 108. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953) (per curiam). 
 109. Id. at 370–71. 
 110. Id. at 373. 
 111. See id. (“If we undertook to evaluate all the separate interests within Pennsylvania, we 
could, in effect, be drawn into an intramural dispute over the distribution of water within the 
Commonwealth . . . . Nor is there any assurance that the list of intervenors could be closed with 
political subdivisions of the states. Large industrial plants which, like cities, are corporate 
creatures of the state may represent interests just as substantial.”). 
 112. See id. at 372 (“[Parens patriae] is a recognition of the principle that the state, when a 
party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, ‘must be deemed to represent all its 
citizens.’” (quoting Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 173–74 (1930))). 
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policy by its own subjects.”113 Thus the New Jersey test limited 
equitable-apportionment decrees to interstate allocation rather than 
intrastate allocation, largely preserving traditional water federalism 
for consumptive water rights. In practice, this test has created a 
sufficiently high burden such that prior to South Carolina, the only 
nonstate parties who had successfully intervened in equitable-
apportionment actions were the federal government and Native 
American tribes.114 
III.  CITIZEN INTERVENTION IN EQUITABLE-APPORTIONMENT 
ACTIONS 
A. A Relaxed Standard for Citizen Intervention: South Carolina v. 
North Carolina 
State control of water allocation is firmly grounded in both the 
Supreme Court’s equitable-apportionment precedents and public 
trust principles. As a result, the Court’s original jurisdiction was 
historically a forum of last resort for water quarrels. In South 
Carolina, the special master formulated a broad rule and 
recommended that all three parties (Duke Energy, the CRWSP, and 
Charlotte) be granted leave to intervene.115 South Carolina filed 
exceptions with respect to each of the three parties.116 
By permitting Duke Energy and the CRWSP to intervene, but 
not Charlotte,117 the Court relaxed its standard for private party 
intervention in interstate water disputes. Thus, the Court gave 
nonsovereign parties unprecedented access to represent their private 
interests against the sovereign interests of the party-states. The 
Court’s reinterpretation of the New Jersey test and its inconsistent 
application of the parens patriae doctrine to the three prospective 
intervenors threaten to put the Court in the business of allocating 
water within states as well as between states. As a result, the Supreme 
Court compromised state sovereign ownership and public trust values 
 
 113. Id. at 373. 
 114. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614–15 (1983) (allowing five Native 
American tribes to intervene); New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 370–71 (recognizing Pennsylvania’s, but 
not Philadelphia’s, right to intervene). 
 115. The special master formulated a new rule to govern intervention in original actions that 
would seem to greatly expand direct access to the Supreme Court on behalf of private parties. 
See infra notes 164–170 and accompanying text. 
 116. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 859 (2010). 
 117. Id. 
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and undermined the power of state legislatures to allocate water 
resources through the political process. 
B. Applying the New Jersey Test and the Parens Patriae Doctrine 
The New Jersey test, which the Court reaffirmed in South 
Carolina, requires that the nonstate intervenor “show a compelling 
interest ‘in his own right,’ distinct from the collective interest of ‘all 
other citizens and creatures of the state,’ whose interest the State 
presumptively represents in matters of sovereign policy.”118 Thus, the 
New Jersey test has two prongs: the interest must be distinct from the 
interest of other state citizens as a class and not presumptively 
represented by a party-state. 
1. The City of Charlotte.  The Court held that Charlotte could not 
intervene, likely because the New Jersey test had specifically denied 
Philadelphia’s intervention when Pennsylvania was already a party to 
the suit.119 Both Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts agreed that 
Charlotte’s interest was no different from that of any other 
municipality, individual, or corporation within North Carolina that 
would want to put its straw in the river.120 Under the doctrine of 
parens patriae, the state is presumed to represent the interest of its 
citizens in matters implicating state sovereignty. This principle holds 
true even when the state’s and the citizen’s interests are inconsistent 
or even in opposition to each other.121 Thus, regardless of whether 
North Carolina would actually represent Charlotte’s interests well or 
at all, North Carolina is presumed to represent Charlotte’s interests, 
because the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is not the proper 
forum for a state to be “judicially impeached on matters of policy by 
its own subjects.”122 The limitation of the Court’s original jurisdiction 
to disputes in which there is no other appropriate forum influenced 
the Court in denying Charlotte’s intervention, because Charlotte had 
the option of pursuing its grievances in state court. 
 
 118. Id. at 867 (quoting New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373).  
 119. See supra notes 108–111. 
 120. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 867; id. at 873 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 121. See Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 162, 173 (1930) (“A State suing, or sued, in this 
Court, by virtue of the original jurisdiction over controversies between States, must be deemed 
to represent all its citizens.”). 
 122. New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373. 
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2. Duke Energy and the Catawba River Water Supply Project.  
Although both Duke Energy and the CRWSP could also be expected 
to pursue grievances in state court, the Supreme Court found that 
they satisfied both prongs of the New Jersey test. But Justice Alito’s 
analysis deviated from his own expression of the New Jersey test as 
applied to Charlotte. Both parties had a stake in the dispute because 
they both depend on the Catawba’s waters and would be affected, at 
least indirectly, by the outcome. Duke Energy operates eleven 
hydroelectric dams along the Catawba River “that generate electricity 
for the region and control the flow of the river,” and its interest in the 
litigation could thus have been described as compelling.123 The 
CRWSP, representing the water-consuming citizens of two counties, 
could have been characterized similarly.124 But neither Duke Energy 
nor the CRWSP should have been deemed to satisfy either prong of 
the New Jersey test. 
a. A Compelling Interest Distinct from the Interests of Other State 
Citizens as a Class.  Rather than focusing on the type of interest at 
stake—as the first prong of the New Jersey test requires—the Court 
instead emphasized Duke Energy’s “powerful interests that likely will 
shape the outcome of this litigation,” finding “no other similarly 
situated entity on the Catawba River.”125 In contrast, Chief Justice 
Roberts, in dissent, found Duke Energy’s interests to be no different 
from those of any other user of the Catawba River’s water in the 
Carolinas: “The State’s ‘citizens and creatures’ certainly put the 
Catawba’s water and flow to different uses—many for drinking water, 
some for farming or recreation, others for generating power. That 
does not, however, make their interest in the water itself unique.”126 
Thus, although Duke Energy likely uses more water on the Catawba 
than any other individual user, its interest is still part of a class of 
other water users. 
It follows that if the Court were to apportion water directly to 
Duke Energy, it would effectively be apportioning water within states 
rather than between states. Chief Justice Roberts noted that “[o]ther 
citizens of North Carolina doubtless have reasons of their own, ones 
they find as important as Duke Energy believes its to be,” and 
 
 123. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 866. 
 124. Id. at 864–65. 
 125. Id. at 866. 
 126. Id. at 873 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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“[w]eighing those interests is an ‘intramural’ matter for the State.”127 
Even though Duke Energy’s hydropower operations are substantial, 
it still should not be able to defend its interest as a coequal litigant 
with North Carolina and South Carolina, who each represent the 
interests of countless state water users, including Duke Energy. 
Following a similar line of reasoning as it applied to Duke 
Energy, the Court found that the CRWSP’s interest was distinct from 
those of other citizens of the Carolinas because of the volume of its 
withdrawals, the value of its water infrastructure investments, and its 
status as a bistate entity.128 These arguments do not withstand 
scrutiny, nor do they reflect a cogent application of the New Jersey 
test. Many other counties in both North and South Carolina depend 
on the Catawba River and have spent money on water infrastructure; 
the CRWSP’s interests cannot be distinct simply because the entity 
involves counties from both states.129 
The Court also found Duke Energy’s interest distinct because of 
its existing license with FERC and its ongoing efforts to renew the 
license.130 But the Court’s reasoning focused on the useful information 
Duke Energy would provide rather than on the extent to which Duke 
Energy’s relationship with the federal government made it distinct 
from other citizen water users in the Carolinas.131 In fact, the United 
States filed an amicus brief that refuted Duke Energy’s assertion that 
the pending renewal of its FERC license merited the power 
company’s intervention.132 The mere fact that Duke Energy possesses 
information relevant (or even indispensable) to the dispute does not 
merit its party status, because possessing information does not set 
 
 127. Id. at 874. 
 128. Id. at 864 (majority opinion). 
 129. See infra notes 145–150 and accompanying text. 
 130. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 866–67.  
 131. See id. at 866–67 (“[Duke Energy’s Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement], likewise, 
represents the full consensus of 70 parties from both States regarding the appropriate minimum 
continuous flow of Catawba River water into South Carolina under a variety of natural 
conditions and, in times of drought, the conservation measures to be taken by entities that 
withdraw water from the Catawba River. These factors undeniably are relevant to any ‘just and 
equitable apportionment’ of the Catawba River and we are likely to consider them in reaching 
our ultimate disposition of this case.” (citation omitted) (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 
U.S. 176, 183 (1982))). 
 132. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff’s Exceptions at 20 
n.3, South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (No. 138) (“[S]o long as the terms of the [relicensing 
agreement] are taken into account in the equitable apportionment, the mere fact that Duke 
impounds and releases the waters being apportioned does not give Duke a sufficiently concrete 
interest in the outcome of the apportionment.”). 
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Duke Energy apart from other citizens as a class. Many other citizens 
of the Carolinas may also have relevant information, but information 
alone is quite different from having a “distinct interest.” 
The Court analogized permitting Duke Energy and the 
CRWSP’s intervention to its decision in Maryland v. Louisiana,133 a 
case in which seventeen private gas pipeline companies were 
permitted to intervene in an original action.134 But beyond the surface 
similarities, Maryland is easily distinguishable from South Carolina. 
In fact, Maryland provides an excellent example of the kind of 
interest that is compelling and “distinct from the collective interest of 
‘all other citizens and creatures of the state’”135 under the New Jersey 
test. In Maryland, several states challenged the constitutionality of 
Louisiana’s tax on natural gas imported into the state.136 The Court 
reasoned, “[g]iven that the Tax is directly imposed on the owner of 
the imported gas and that the pipeline companies most often own the 
gas, those companies have a direct stake in this controversy.”137 
Dissenting in South Carolina, Chief Justice Roberts distinguished 
Duke Energy and the CRWSP’s interests from those of the pipeline 
companies, explaining that “an interest in a tax imposed only on 
discrete parties is obviously different from a general interest shared 
by all citizens of the State.”138 In a footnote, Chief Justice Roberts 
further suggested that a private party “with a federal statutory right to 
a certain quantity of water might have a compelling interest in an 
equitable-apportionment action that is not fairly represented by the 
States.”139 The distinguishing fact in the Chief Justice’s hypothetical is 
that the private intervenor would be asserting a right to use water 
based in federal law rather than state law, and thus a state would not 
be presumed to represent that federal water interest. But when a 
water user’s rights are wholly dependent on state law, it should be 
difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy the New Jersey test. 
 
 133. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981). 
 134. Id. at 745 n.21; see also South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 862 (“More recently, the Court 
has . . . permitted corporations to intervene in an original action challenging a State’s imposition 
of a tax that burdened interstate commerce and contravened the Supremacy Clause . . . .” (citing 
Maryland, 451 U.S. at 745 n.21)). 
 135. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 867 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 
(1953) (per curiam)). 
 136. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 728. 
 137. Id. at 745 n.21. 
 138. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 873 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 139. Id. at 872 n.1. 
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b. An Interest Not Presumptively Represented by a Party-State.  
Although Justice Alito correctly stated the second factor in terms of 
whether the proposed intervenor is presumptively represented by a 
party-state, when applying the factor to Duke Energy and the 
CRWSP he instead considered whether the private intervenors are 
actually represented by the party-states. The Court noted that neither 
North Carolina nor South Carolina had “signed [Duke Energy’s 
FERC relicensing agreement] or expressed an intention to defend its 
terms.”140 Justice Alito’s observation suggests that Duke Energy may 
not like how the party-states would actually represent its interests, but 
that observation should not have been decisive. That is, North 
Carolina and South Carolina must be presumed to represent all water 
users within their borders. The people of the Carolinas may rely on 
Duke Energy’s hydroelectric power, but state governments, not the 
Supreme Court, should bear the responsibility of balancing power 
generation with competing uses of water. 
Similarly, with respect to the CRWSP, Justice Alito noted that 
South Carolina’s complaint included the CRWSP’s transfers to North 
Carolina as a portion of the total harm it attributed to North 
Carolina, and that North Carolina had asserted it could not represent 
the CRWSP as a joint venture.141 Justice Alito also considered that 
“[t]he stresses that this litigation would place upon the CRWSP 
threaten to upset the fine balance on which the joint venture is 
premised, and neither State has sufficient interest in maintaining that 
balance to represent the full scope of the CRWSP’s interests.”142 
Again, Justice Alito provided evidence supporting whether North 
Carolina or South Carolina could adequately represent a party, rather 
than whether either state is presumed to represent the CRWSP under 
the parens patriae doctrine. Here, South Carolina is presumed to 
represent Lancaster County and North Carolina is presumed to 
represent Union County. Although it seems unlikely that either state 
would sacrifice the interests of these particular counties in favor of 
other water users, it is fully within their right to do so. Because the 
“CRWSP’s position is really no different from Charlotte’s,”143 if either 
 
 140. Id. at 867 (majority opinion). 
 141. Id. at 865. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 874 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see 
also First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 5, at 25. 
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county objects to its treatment, it may pursue its grievances in state 
court. 
Because water is a sovereign interest, the states are properly 
deemed to represent the water rights of citizens such as Duke Energy 
and the CRWSP. Chief Justice Roberts observed that a private 
party’s interest is “‘not properly represented’ by a State when it is not 
a sovereign interest but instead a parochial one.”144 Here, Chief 
Justice Roberts highlighted how Justice Alito redefined “properly 
represented” to mean well represented rather than presumptively 
represented. Therefore, by broadening the definition of proper 
representation under the New Jersey test, the Court effectively 
relaxed the citizen intervention standard for equitable 
apportionments. 
Although the Court was persuaded that Duke Energy and the 
CRWSP, as multistate entities, could not be presumptively 
represented by either state, this argument does not hold up to 
scrutiny. The Court’s precedents suggest that the parens patriae 
doctrine applies equally to corporate entities, multistate entities, and 
corporate multistate entities.145 Duke Energy is headquartered in 
Charlotte and has substantial operations in both states.146 Similarly, 
the CRWSP represents the interests of a South Carolina county and a 
North Carolina county.147 It follows that these entities would be 
represented by both state governments rather than neither. Thus, 
North Carolina can be presumed to represent Duke Energy’s 
interests as its place of incorporation and South Carolina can be 
presumed to represent Duke Energy’s operations within its borders. 
Chief Justice Roberts cautioned that “[a] bistate entity cannot be 
allowed to intervene merely because it embodies an ‘intermingling of 
 
 144. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 874 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953) 
(per curiam)). 
 145. See, e.g., New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373 (“The case before us demonstrates the wisdom of 
the [parens patriae principle]. The City of Philadelphia represents only a part of the citizens of 
Pennsylvania who reside in the watershed area of the Delaware River . . . . Furthermore, we are 
told by New Jersey that there are cities along the Delaware River in that State which, like 
Philadelphia, are responsible for their own water systems . . . . Nor is there any assurance that 
the list of intervenors could be closed with political subdivisions of the states. Large industrial 
plants which, like cities, are corporate creatures of the state may represent interests just as 
substantial.”). 
 146. About Us, DUKE ENERGY, http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/default.asp (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
 147. See supra note 10. 
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state interests,’” because “[t]he same would be true of any bistate 
entity, or indeed any corporation or individual conducting business in 
both States.”148 Thus, the Court may have opened its doors to any 
corporation doing business in both North Carolina and South 
Carolina that also happens to rely on water from the Catawba River. 
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts explained that “[b]istate entities are 
not States entitled to invoke our original jurisdiction, and should not 
be effectively accorded an automatic right to intervene as parties in 
cases within that jurisdiction.”149 Such an interpretation is consistent 
with the Court’s long-held understanding of its original jurisdiction as 
a forum of last resort for interstate disputes concerning issues of state 
sovereignty.150 Thus, bistate status alone should not be sufficient 
grounds to satisfy the New Jersey test. 
Although both Duke Energy and the CRWSP may have had 
compelling reasons to seek intervention, Justice Alito’s determination 
that their interests were distinct from and could not be presumptively 
represented by the party-states is unconvincing under the New Jersey 
test. In New Jersey, the Court was specifically concerned about 
granting Philadelphia’s intervention because “[l]arge industrial plants 
which, like cities, are corporate creatures of the state may represent 
interests just as substantial.”151 The New Jersey Court warned that 
“original jurisdiction should not be thus expanded to the dimension of 
ordinary class actions.”152 By allowing Duke Energy and the CRWSP 
to intervene in South Carolina, the Supreme Court crippled the New 
Jersey test, effectively relaxing the standard for citizens seeking to 
intervene in future equitable apportionments and, perhaps, other 
original actions before the Court. 
C. Finding an Appropriate Standard for Citizen Intervention in 
Equitable Apportionments 
Equitable apportionments are unique among original actions. 
But the New Jersey test, which was developed in the context of an 
equitable-apportionment action, has been the standard for 
 
 148. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 874 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 865 n.6 (majority opinion)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See supra Part III.A. 
 151. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953) (per curiam). 
 152. Id. 
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intervention in other original actions between states.153 In South 
Carolina, both Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged 
that an equitable apportionment might impose a higher burden for 
private intervention, but they disagreed as to how much higher this 
burden should be.154 Citizen intervention in equitable-apportionment 
actions challenges both the boundaries of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction and a state’s sovereign right to allocate water resources 
within its borders. Building on Chief Justice Roberts’s defense of 
state sovereignty, this Note argues that because of the law governing 
water resources in the United States, and the challenges presented by 
the energy-water nexus, the test for private-party intervention in an 
original action should, as a normative matter, bar most attempts at 
citizen intervention in equitable apportionments. 
First, the Supreme Court has freely admitted that it is ill suited to 
serve as a trial court in equitable-apportionment and other original 
actions.155 The Court’s constitutionally granted original jurisdiction is 
thus born out of “a necessary recognition of sovereign dignity,”156 in 
keeping with the Court’s understanding of original jurisdiction as a 
forum of last resort. In South Carolina, Chief Justice Roberts warned 
that “[t]he Court’s decision to permit nonsovereigns to intervene in 
this case has the potential to alter in a fundamental way the nature of 
our original jurisdiction, transforming it from a means of resolving 
high disputes between sovereigns into a forum for airing private 
interests.”157 And the New Jersey Court voiced this same concern 
 
 153. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97 (1972) (applying the New Jersey test 
when Illinois sought relief against several municipal entities in Wisconsin for allegedly polluting 
Lake Michigan).  
 154. Compare South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 862 (majority opinion) (“[A] compelling reason 
for allowing citizens to participate in one original action is not necessarily a compelling reason 
for allowing citizens to intervene in all original actions.”), with id. at 871 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e have strongly intimated in 
other decisions (albeit in dictum) that private entities can rarely, if ever, intervene in original 
actions involving the apportionment of interstate waterways.”). 
 155. See id. at 863 (majority opinion) (“[Original] actions tax the limited resources of this 
Court by requiring us ‘awkwardly to play the role of factfinder’ and diverting our attention from 
our primary responsibility as an appellate tribunal.” (quoting Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 
401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971))). 
 156. New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373; see also United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643 (1892) 
(“Such exclusive jurisdiction was given to this court, because it best comported with the dignity 
of a State, that a case in which it was a party should be determined in the highest, rather than in 
a subordinate judicial tribunal of the nation.”). 
 157. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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when it described its test as “a working rule for good judicial 
administration,” to prevent a scenario in which “a state might be 
judicially impeached on matters of policy by its own subjects, and 
there would be no practical limitation on the number of citizens, as 
such, who would be entitled to be made parties.”158 Although the 
Chief Justice may have overstated the risk in suggesting that original 
actions may become “town-meeting lawsuits,”159 given the Court’s 
limited resources and the likely increase in water conflicts due to the 
energy-water nexus and global climate change, even a small rise in 
successful citizen intervenors may hinder the Court’s ability to resolve 
interstate water disputes. 
The United States’ amicus brief advocated a similar position, 
arguing that relaxing the standard for intervention “could potentially 
involve the Court in the resolution of intramural water disputes on 
the scale of state-wide general stream adjudication.”160 The amicus 
brief further expressed concern that “even assuming that these 
actions could be litigated manageably with a significantly expanded 
number of parties, the expansion would make it significantly less 
likely that these cases could be settled.”161 Although in this particular 
case, Duke Energy played a central role in bringing the parties to a 
settlement,162 it does not necessarily follow that settlement occurred 
because the Court permitted it to intervene. Duke Energy could have 
played a similar role by filing an amicus brief and participating in 
interstate negotiations.163 
Second, the mistaken presumption that a party with necessary 
information is indispensable to an equitable apportionment is 
reflected in the special master’s rule, which the Court in South 
Carolina rejected as overly broad. The special master’s proposed 
 
 158. New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373. 
 159. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 870 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 376 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
 160. Brief for United States in Support of Plaintiff’s Exceptions, supra note 132, at 21. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Lyle Denniston, The Key to Settling a Big Fight, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 17, 2010, 7:40 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/12/the-key-to-settling-a-big-fight (“[W]hen negotiations 
that followed the ruling came to an end this Fall, the two states rallied around Duke Energy’s 
interests, and made a deal that might last for the next four or five decades, supposedly a model 
for regional cooperation.”). 
 163. See South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 875 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Where he presents no new questions, a third party can contribute 
usually most effectively and always most expeditiously by a brief amicus curiae and not by 
intervention.” (quoting Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 359 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam))). 
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standard would have permitted intervention in a far wider range of 
circumstances than would the New Jersey test. It would encompass a 
party that is “the instrumentality authorized to carry out the wrongful 
conduct or injury for which the complaining state seeks relief,” or a 
party that “has a ‘direct stake’ in the outcome of the action.”164 The 
fact that a party “would advance the ‘full exposition’ of the issues” 
would further support intervention.165 Additionally, the special 
master’s rule failed to account properly for the parens patriae 
doctrine, which is implicated by both factors of the New Jersey test. 
Under the special master’s standard, Charlotte’s and the CRWSP’s 
motions to intervene were granted because the parties were 
“authorized to carry out” the interbasin transfers of which South 
Carolina complained.166 In contrast, Duke Energy’s motion was 
granted because of its “direct stake in the outcome” and ability to 
advance “a full exposition of the issues.”167 
The Court explicitly declined to adopt the special master’s 
proposed standard but implicitly incorporated elements of that 
standard into its application of the New Jersey test. Justice Alito 
dismissed the special master’s standard because “a compelling reason 
for allowing citizens to participate in one original action is not 
necessarily a compelling reason for allowing citizens to intervene in 
all original actions.”168 Although Justice Alito noted that the special 
master’s rule accounted for “the full compass of our precedents,” 
referring to original actions broadly, he preferred the more limited 
New Jersey test developed in the context of an equitable 
apportionment.169 But the special master’s rule seems to explain the 
outcome better than does Justice Alito’s application of the New 
Jersey test, which was discussed in Part III.B. The majority opinion 
emphasized both Duke Energy’s impact on the Catawba River’s flow 
through the operation of its hydropower facilities and its ability to 
provide essential information.170 Both of these concerns are quite 
relevant to the special master’s standard, but they have little bearing 
on the New Jersey test. The Court’s rejection of the special master’s 
proposed rule would seem to support a conclusion that equitable 
 
 164. First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 5, at 20–21. 
 165. Id. at 21. 
 166. Id. at 9. 
 167. Id. at 28–32. 
 168. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 862. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 866. 
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apportionments are distinct from other classes of original actions. But 
instead, throughout the majority opinion, Justice Alito framed the 
issue as whether the parties should be permitted to intervene in an 
original action, echoing the special master’s standard, which was 
derived from a range of original jurisdiction precedents.171 In contrast, 
Chief Justice Roberts framed the issue in terms of intervention in an 
equitable apportionment specifically.172 
Third, boundary disputes, another frequent player on the Court’s 
original jurisdiction docket, provide an instructive comparison to 
equitable apportionments, highlighting that equitable-apportionment 
actions are different because of the communal nature of water rights 
in the United States. In a boundary dispute, a party-state may rely 
substantially on a private party’s ownership interest in asserting its 
sovereign interest. For example, in Texas v. Louisiana,173 the Court 
permitted Port Arthur to intervene because it claimed title to islands 
in the Sabine River that were the subject of a dispute between the 
federal government and Texas.174 Unlike a boundary dispute, in which 
a private party seeks to intervene to defend its title, private parties in 
equitable apportionments do not have equivalent property interests 
to justify intervention. A usufructuary interest in water is distinct 
from private title to land, in which ownership entails considerably 
more than a limited right to use a natural resource for certain 
purposes. This distinction is supported by both the inherent qualities 
of water resources and the structure of water law in the United 
States.175 All original actions before the Supreme Court are sovereign 
disputes, but some disputes may more significantly implicate 
sovereign concerns and public values than others. In water-rights 
disputes, the absence of a legally cognizable private ownership right 
 
 171. See id. at 862 (“This Court likewise has granted leave, under appropriate circumstances, 
for non-state entities to intervene as parties in original actions between states for nearly 90 
years.”). 
 172. See id. at 870 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Applying [the compelling-interest test], this Court has never granted a nonsovereign entity’s 
motion to intervene in an equitable apportionment action.”). 
 173. Texas v. Louisiana, 426 U.S. 465 (1976) (per curiam). 
 174. Id. at 466; see also South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 862 (citing Texas, 426 U.S. at 466). But 
even a claim to private title does not guarantee intervention. For example, in Utah v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 89 (1969) (per curiam), Morton International, Inc. moved to intervene in a 
dispute over title to portions of the Great Salt Lake, id. at 95. In denying Morton’s intervention, 
the Court noted, “If Morton is admitted, fairness would require the admission of any of the 
other 120 private landowners who wish to quiet their title to portions of the relicted lands, 
greatly increasing the complexity of this litigation.” Id. at 95–96. 
 175. See supra Part I.A. 
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in water typically eliminates the justification for citizen intervention. 
Thus, whereas the New Jersey test alone should be sufficient to bar 
citizen intervention in equitable apportionments, the nature and 
structure of water rights in the United States make such intervention 
all but impossible. 
Ultimately, because of the usufructuary nature of water rights, 
traditional water federalism, and the public trust doctrine, equitable 
apportionments are distinct from other original actions. As discussed 
above in Part III.B, equitable-apportionment decrees control water 
rights at the state level rather than at the individual level. Each 
sovereign state is left to allocate its equitable share according to state-
law principles, without federal intervention. A state’s citizens should 
not be parties to an equitable apportionment because they are not 
individually bound by the Court’s decree.176 The existence of an 
appropriate, alternate forum—in this case, state court—for both 
Duke Energy and the CRWSP to dispute an intrastate allocation of 
water also counsels against giving private entities access to the 
Court’s discretionary original jurisdiction. Chief Justice Roberts 
would have denied citizen intervention to protect state sovereignty 
and the Court’s own docket, but the communal nature of water 
resources and environmental concerns further caution against a 
relaxed standard for nonstate parties. The public trust doctrine, in 
spite of its fifty different forms, remains the most enduring assertion 
of the communal nature of water rights in the United States, held by 
the state governments as representatives of the people.177 
The looming concerns of the energy-water nexus and global 
climate change reinforce the need to protect the role of the states 
under the public trust doctrine. The public trust doctrine shapes what 
states can and cannot do with trust resources and also the extent to 
which federal courts should defer to states when the management of 
trust resources is at stake, absent congressional intent to the contrary. 
Private parties will rarely have interests in water that are not 
dependent on the interest of the states as representatives of their 
citizens. Therefore, the uniquely public values implicated by equitable 
apportionments and the communal nature of water resources support 
that it should be difficult for private parties to defend their interests 
in water as coequal litigants with sovereign states. 
 
 176. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  
 177. See supra Part I.A.  
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IV.  THE FUTURE OF INTERSTATE WATER DISPUTES: COURTS AND 
LEGISLATURES 
Although the Supreme Court has proved reasonably adept at 
balancing states’ claims in equitable-apportionment actions, 
evaluating tradeoffs between competing types of water uses has not 
played a central role in equitable-apportionment jurisprudence. As 
the California Supreme Court characterized, “The scope and 
technical complexity of issues concerning water-resource 
management are unequalled by virtually any other type of activity 
presented to the courts.”178 The U.S. Supreme Court should recognize 
that adjudicating interstate water rights pushes the boundaries of its 
institutional competence,179 beyond the inherent concerns of 
simultaneously playing the roles of trial and appellate court. The 
energy-water nexus dictates that states must make key tradeoffs 
between the need to use water resources in energy production versus 
other consumptive uses, as evidenced by the energy-water challenges 
facing Charlotte and other metropolitan areas across the United 
States.180 Although evaluating competing policy proposals for national 
water policy is beyond the scope of this Note, these kinds of tradeoffs 
in the allocation of scarce natural resources, which are “highly 
charged political issues,” are best handled through the political 
process, at either the state or federal level, rather than through the 
courts.181 
Several scholars have challenged the efficacy of equitable 
apportionment as compared to interstate compacts or congressional 
intervention because of federalism concerns and the Court’s inability 
to handle the highly technical information required to develop good 
 
 178. Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1980) (quoting Envtl. 
Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 572 P.2d 1128, 1137 (Cal. 1977)). 
 179. Cf. Eric T. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin and the Common Law Burdens of Modern Water 
Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 485, 522 (1986) (“[M]any courts today do not realize that, in altering 
common law water doctrines, they are altering the rules by which allocations are 
made . . . . [C]ourts today typically understate their allocative role and therefore fail to fulfill it 
competently.”). 
 180. See Sovacool, supra note 4, at 25–33 (describing the challenges faced by electric utilities 
and water planners in eight metropolitan areas). 
 181. See, e.g., Henry Melvin Hart, Jr., Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 40, 45 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959) (“[The 
legislature] is most significantly an instrument of negotiation and compromise of highly charged 
political issues which cannot be brought to acceptable settlement through the everyday 
processes of administration and adjudication. For the performance of this function it is superbly 
and uniquely equipped.”). 
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water policy. Professor Dan Tarlock suggests that such criticisms are 
widespread because “[j]udicial deference to the quasi-sovereign states 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to do other than to 
articulate vague standards of interstate equality rather than firm 
principles such as economic maximization.”182 But Professor Tarlock 
argues that “the Supreme Court has often shown itself capable of 
striking sensible accommodation among competing demands,” 
particularly in the interpretation of existing compacts.183 Others have 
not been quite so generous. For example, Professor Carl Erhardt 
argues that “the Court is inherently incapable of fully understanding 
the technicalities that are necessary in providing for an equitable 
solution,” leading to “a lack of truly informed decision-making” and 
“unpredictable results.”184 
In response to the perceived problems of equitable 
apportionment, some scholars have advocated a stronger role for 
Congress in resolving interstate water-rights disputes.185 But 
considering both the historical infrequency of congressional 
apportionments and the politically charged nature of these disputes, it 
seems unlikely that Congress will assume a more significant role in 
interstate water-rights disputes. Thus, Supreme Court equitable 
apportionments will continue to wield significant influence.186 In 
addition, regardless of how many interstate water-rights disputes 
actually come before the Supreme Court, its equitable-apportionment 
jurisprudence casts a long shadow over settlement and compact 
negotiations. Thus, if the Court’s holding in South Carolina leads to 
an increased role for the Court in guiding intrastate water allocation 
policy, the repercussions will be felt broadly, as global climate change 
will likely lead to regional increases in drought conditions and more 
interstate water-rights conflicts. 
The Catawba-Wateree Basin illustrates the complex 
interdependence of energy and water policy, and this 
 
 182. Tarlock, supra note 78, at 382.  
 183. Id. at 411. 
 184. Carl Erhardt, The Battle Over “The Hooch”: The Federal-Interstate Water Compact and 
the Resolution of Rights in the Chattahoochee River, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 200, 213–14 (1992). 
 185. See generally Sherk, supra note 79; E. Leif Reid, Note, Ripples from the Truckee: The 
Case for Congressional Apportionment of Disputed Interstate Water Rights, 14 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 145 (1995).  
 186. See, e.g., Dyckman, supra note 80, at 229 (“But the court system is increasingly 
becoming the locus of these decisions in the absence of cooperation. And in making allocations 
that change uses, associated property rights, and growth itself, the U.S. Supreme Court impacts 
the rest of the country’s water management.”). 
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interdependence cautions that the Court not overreach in its 
equitable-apportionment cases by engaging with substantive water-
allocation policy, however indirectly. As discussed in Part I, Charlotte 
was named the country’s metropolitan area most at risk for water 
shortages due to power-plant withdrawals.187 These water shortages 
are anticipated largely because of plans by Duke Energy to build new 
thermoelectric plants in the Catawba-Wateree Basin.188 Duke Energy 
is already the largest single water user in the Catawba-Wateree 
Basin,189 and its entire energy portfolio in the Carolinas (comprised of 
hydroelectric, coal-fired, nuclear, oil, and natural-gas energy 
resources) is water intensive.190 Duke Energy has already faced 
electricity supply problems from its plants on the Catawba River 
during drought conditions.191 As is unsurprising for one of America’s 
most endangered rivers,192 the Catawba faces a wide range of water-
quality issues, all of which are exacerbated by low water levels, 
including too many nutrients, too little dissolved oxygen, and fecal 
coliform and mercury contamination.193 Thus, the Catawba River 
presents economic and environmental management challenges that 
necessitate tradeoffs by policymakers who are fully engaged with the 
concerns of municipalities, scientists, industry, and citizens. And the 
Catawba-Wateree Basin is only one of many similarly situated areas 
in the country facing policy tradeoffs in allocating scarce water 
resources, compounding the importance of these challenges. 
Many were pleased with the results of the negotiated settlement 
between the states, Duke Energy, and the CRWSP, including the 
 
 187. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Sovacool, supra note 4, at 26–27 (“[T]he associated water use with [Duke Energy’s 
planned thermoelectric plants] could exacerbate drought (at best) and risk interstate litigation 
and agricultural collapse (at worst).”). 
 189. See Water Quality Facts, CATAWBA RIVERKEEPER, http://www.catawbariverkeeper 
.org/News/waterqualityfacts (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (“Evaporative losses from cooling [Duke 
Energy’s] nuclear and coal-fired power plants makes up almost 50% of the net water use in the 
basin.”). 
 190. Sovacool, supra note 4, at 26–27; Alert: 2007 Drought Advisories, Drought Advisory #2, 
CATAWBA RIVERKEEPER (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.catawbariverkeeper.org/News/News/
alert-2007-drought-advisory. 
 191. See News Release, Duke Energy, Duke Energy Carolinas Announces Special Power 
Purchase and Seeks Cost Recovery (Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www.duke-energy.com/
news/releases/2008030401.asp (detailing Duke Energy’s efforts to manage drought conditions, 
such as reducing hydropower operations, modifying plants, and purchasing power from another 
supplier in South Carolina). 
 192. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 193. Water Quality Facts, supra note 189. 
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Catawba Riverkeeper Foundation, a nonprofit environmental group. 
The Southern Environmental Law Center, which represented the 
Riverkeeper, characterized the agreement as “a model for water 
conservation and efficiency measures that, if adopted by other 
municipalities, could help protect all the state’s rivers.”194 Even 
though the settlement may have led to greater cooperation in the 
Carolinas, Professor Caitlin Dyckman is cautious, noting that “the 
precipitating circumstances [in South Carolina] were quite fortuitous, 
and may not be replicable; using litigation in lieu of negotiation is 
rarely preferable.”195 The use of a special master, without the benefit 
of a full trial process to ensure adequate factfinding, raises particular 
concerns about making policy through the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction.196 It remains to be seen whether South Carolina will lead 
to a dramatic influx of private intervenors along the lines of the 
parade of horribles offered by Chief Justice Roberts.197 But the 
potential for nonsovereign intervention will likely further complicate 
water-resource management at the state government level. 
In this sense, the Court’s South Carolina holding reflects a short-
sighted disregard for the complex policy challenges implicated by 
giving a private water user—whose “interest in water is an interest 
shared with other citizens,”198—party status in an equitable 
apportionment. Further, South Carolina put the Court in the driver’s 
seat and will allow the Court again to put its thumb on the scale in 
favoring some citizen water users over others, simply because they 
use more water—Duke Energy—or because the Court finds a 
particular citizen claim more compelling than another—the CRWSP 
as compared to Charlotte. As with Duke Energy’s intervention, such 
a policy favors the settled expectations of existing users and ties 
 
 194. Catawba River Interbasin Transfer Controversy Resolved, CATAWBA RIVERKEEPER, 
(Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.catawbariverkeeper.org/News/con-kan-ibt-dispute-finds-resolution 
(quoting Julie Youngman, an attorney for the Southern Environmental Law Center). 
 195. Dyckman, supra note 80, at 229. 
 196. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
 197. Chief Justice Roberts warned that nonsovereign intervention would “inevitably 
prolong the resolution of this and other equitable apportionment actions, which already take 
considerable time. Intervenors do not come alone—they bring along more issues to decide, 
more discovery requests, more exceptions to the recommendations of the Special Master.” 
South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 875 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 198. Id. at 870. 
STARR IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2013  3:55 PM 
2013] INTERVENTION IN WATER DISPUTES 1461 
states’ hands with respect to introducing conservation measures.199 
Professor Sax hoped that courts would step in when captured 
legislatures and agencies failed to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities 
to state citizens, in part because he believed that courts could more 
effectively stand up to the water-rights claims of powerful private 
interests.200 But the adaptability of public trust principles makes the 
doctrine equally applicable when a federal court encroaches on the 
natural-resource obligations of the state governments. Ultimately, the 
federal common law of equitable apportionment developed to resolve 
sovereign disputes, not to make national water policy when Congress 
has not offered guidance on the issue. Although the settled 
expectations of existing users matter, environmental and natural-
resource management considerations favor maintaining the states’ 
traditional authority to determine the intrastate allocation of water 
rights by evaluating the interests of each individual water user in a 
process that is accountable to voters. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the thorny task presented by an equitable 
apportionment of interstate waters, the Supreme Court was largely 
successful throughout the twentieth century in balancing the 
competing claims of states and recognizing each state’s sovereign 
right to control and allocate the water resources within its borders. 
Now, the Court’s deviation from this tradition in South Carolina 
threatens its own ability to resolve these disputes and state 
legislatures’ ability to confront increasing freshwater scarcity. Both 
equitable-apportionment precedents and the state public trust 
doctrines should have prevented Duke Energy and the CRWSP’s 
intervention in South Carolina. Further, the facts of the dispute and 
the policy concerns of the energy-water nexus and global climate 
change indicate that a rise in citizen interventions will threaten the 
traditional contours of water federalism and create more obstacles to 
developing sound water policy. As a nation and a global community, 
we will continue to face water shortages and the resulting need to 
make tradeoffs between competing uses. Having waded into such a 
complex, volatile, and fundamental policy challenge, the Court should 
 
 199. Cf. Sax, supra note 60, at 474 (“[W]e have a potential head-on conflict between existing 
water users and their existing and future demands, and the existing and future demands of what 
may broadly be called in-stream uses.”). 
 200. Id. at 560. 
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step out, dry off, and work to preserve the status of equitable 
apportionments as a forum of last resort for disputes between 
sovereigns. 
